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CONFRONTING UNCERTAINT Y WITH
DECENTR ALIZED COMMAND
British Naval Decision Making at the Outbreak of the War of 1812
Kevin D. McCranie

O

n June 18, 1812, the United States declared war on Britain. Although the declaration hardly could be described as unexpected, given years of strained relations, the United States did obtain a degree of surprise.1 This was inevitable given
the distance between the two countries and the nature of period communications
—it took weeks to transmit information between the United States and Britain.
The slowness of communications created a window of vulnerability for British
naval forces in North American waters.
Events in Britain only exacerbated the exposure of its naval forces. On June 8,
ten days before the American declaration of war, a new government formed in
London. One of its first acts constituted an attempt to ameliorate a major point
of conflict with the United States: it suspended the restrictions on American
commerce delineated in previous orders in council. Through late June and most
of July, British leaders in London hoped their conciliatory gesture would lead to
a favorable response. Little did they know that the Americans had declared war
five days prior to Britain’s repeal of the orders.2
Only in late July did news of the American war reach London. British decision
makers then had to consider whether the Americans, given the suspension of
the orders in council, would back away from hosKevin D. McCranie is a professor of strategy and
policy at the Naval War College. He is the author of
tilities. The uncertainty contributed to additional
Admiral Lord Keith and the Naval War against Nadelays, and it was not until September 26 that new
poleon (University Press of Florida, 2006) and Utmost Gallantry: The U.S. and Royal Navies at Sea in instructions and leadership reached Halifax, Nova
the War of 1812 (Naval Institute Press, 2011).
Scotia.3
Between the June 18 declaration of war and
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September 26, British naval leaders in North American waters faced tremendous
uncertainty. Vice Admiral Herbert Sawyer, commander of the North American
station and the senior officer at Halifax, served as the theater commander for
an area of operations that spanned southward from the Gulf of Saint Lawrence
in the north, past Halifax and the Eastern Seaboard of the United States, to the
northern edge of the Bahamas; Sawyer’s command stretched eastward to include
Bermuda as well.4
Sawyer had to go to war with the force he had, not necessarily the warships
he needed. He had to execute operations relying on old instructions and his
understanding of British strategic priorities and intent. In an uncertain environment, he had to lead British naval operations in theater while providing his
political leaders with assessments of American intentions. Captain Philip Broke,
commanding the thirty-eight-gun frigate Shannon, was the second key British
naval decision maker in North American waters.5 He oversaw Sawyer’s principal
strike force. Broke’s primary mission involved mitigating the threat the U.S. Navy
posed. This article assesses how Sawyer and Broke made decisions, executed
operations, managed risk, and dealt with uncertainty at the outbreak of the War
of 1812.6
Royal Navy (RN) operations during the opening months of the War of 1812
underscore the complexity of naval decision making at the campaign level. This is
a subject that all too often is lost between descriptions of naval battles and general
narratives of naval war. Yet a study in naval decision making aids in understanding the relationship among governmental leaders, their theater commanders, and
operational elements at sea.
THE WORLD SITUATION
Much of what Sawyer and Broke encountered at the outbreak of the War of 1812
was expected. Naval leaders in the age of sail operated in an environment in
which communications were slow, so officers had to be agile enough to deal with
evolving circumstances, from minor incidents to acts of war. Naval officers had
to be aware of government intent so their actions could fulfill broader objectives.
Yet the specific circumstances that Sawyer and Broke encountered were
unique. Britain already was engaged in a protracted, multitheater war against
Napoleonic France, with the Royal Navy operating in the role of the dominant
naval power. The War of 1812 originated on the periphery of the larger conflict,
meaning the isolation Sawyer and Broke faced was more extreme than their peers
faced in European waters. This was not a new theater in an existing war against a
familiar naval foe, but a new opponent in a geographically distant region fought
in parallel with the ongoing Napoleonic struggle. For Britain, the existential
threat was France, not the United States.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/6
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THE SITUATION IN AMERICA
Even so, leaders in London recognized that something needed to be done. “As
soon as the discussions in America began to take a serious turn,” the secretary
of the British Admiralty explained, “the British government sent orders to their
naval officers, not couched in doubtful terms, but in the plain good old English
style.”7 Leaders in London understood that if the United States initiated hostilities, their theater commander in American waters required guidance.
Sawyer received the following three directives, dated May 1812:
1.	 To repel any hostile aggression, but also take care not to commit one.
2.	 In the event of a declaration of war by America, or the issue of letters of marque,
or any invasion of the provinces and islands [of Canada], to commence and direct
hostilities, and to sink, burn, or destroy American ships, and to pursue all other
measures, offensive and defensive, for the annoyance of the enemy and the protection of his Majesty’s subjects.
3.	 To exercise, except in the specified cases, all possible forbearance towards citizens
of the United States.8

These three instructions sought to meet wider policy aims. Governmental leaders in London attempted to minimize tensions by directing the Royal Navy to
employ “all possible forbearance towards citizens of the United States.”9 They
wanted to avoid a war that necessarily would drain assets from the primary war
against France. If hostilities did occur, destroying American ships would deprive
America of commerce while driving commerce into British protection. Moreover, the elimination of American warships and privateers that could threaten
British merchant shipping forwarded “the protection of his Majesty’s subjects.”10
Avoiding war was the best-case scenario, but if war did occur the initial naval
object sought to limit America’s ability to use and disrupt the maritime commons.
Sawyer’s order “to sink, burn, or destroy American ships” highlighted the
way to protect a critical vulnerability—Britain’s sea lines of communication
(SLOCs). The commerce that passed along these maritime arteries ensured
Britain’s global economic position.11 In 1812, every major RN deployment had
for its fundamental object the protection of British commercial interests, with
naval stations arranged at terminal, choke, and transit points along the SLOCs.12
Major trade routes included the link between the British Isles and their possessions in the West Indies. These trade routes were largely dependent on prevailing
currents and winds. The latter circled the Atlantic in a clockwise pattern. Shipping outward bound from Britain plunged south until it reached the latitude
of Barbados, where it caught trade winds that propelled it westward across the
Atlantic. The return voyage to Britain followed the predictable current of the Gulf
Stream. This brought such shipping close to the Eastern Seaboard of the United
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
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States. Sawyer’s North American command mitigated threats to commerce on
this part of the return voyage. At approximately the latitude of Boston, shipping
pressed eastward into the Atlantic, using the Azores as a waypoint on its voyage
to the British Isles.13 Moreover, Sawyer’s command was positioned to protect the
terminal point of the sea-lanes between the British Isles and its possessions in
Canada. The U.S. declaration of war put these sea-lanes at immediate risk. The
instructions to Sawyer attempted to mitigate this vulnerability by directing him
to destroy American warships, privateers, and merchant commerce. The object of
ensuring the security of the SLOCs dominated the design and execution of British naval operations during the opening months of the War of 1812.
OPENING ENGAGEMENTS—AND CONFUSION
On June 23, 1812, about a hundred miles east of New York, lookouts aboard the
thirty-six-gun British frigate Belvidera sighted a small squadron. Captain Richard
Byron identified the strangers as American warships. Given his orders and the
tension between the United States and Britain, he beat a hasty retreat, but the
squadron gave chase. During the afternoon, the lead ship, the American frigate
President under Commodore John Rodgers, opened fire. Only then did Byron
allow his crew to engage. Three hours into the chase, Byron had his crew start
the water over the side and cast nonessential items into the sea. Now lighter, Belvidera drew away from its pursuers. It had been a close-run affair.14 These were
the opening shots of the War of 1812 at sea.
Four days later, Byron brought Belvidera into the harbor at Halifax, where he
found Admiral Sawyer.15 Sawyer must have been unsure how to proceed. His
most recent instructions directed him “[t]o repel any hostile aggression, but also
take care not to commit one.”16 With regard to the latter, he had only to remember
several previous shooting incidents between British and American warships. In
1807, HMS Leopard had fired on the American frigate Chesapeake owing to a suspicion of British deserters aboard the American warship. Outrage in the United
States nearly resulted in war. Four years later, in 1811, Rodgers, commanding
President, almost destroyed the British warship Little Belt. This shooting incident
occurred in the dark; both the British and the Americans thought the other at
fault.17 Indicative of the early confusion over Belvidera’s encounter, one British
periodical posited, “Our Government has expressed an opinion, that the attack
made upon the Belvidera had neither resulted from any new orders of the American Government, nor was any proof that war had been decided on.”18
Was Belvidera’s engagement merely another incident, or was it war? Sawyer
needed confirmation. If it had been a mere incident, an overzealous and aggressive reaction could precipitate actual war; whereas if hostilities already existed,
hesitation could result in the loss of British warships, commerce, or worse.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/6
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Sawyer’s instructions were clear: if he could confirm that a state of war existed,
he was “to commence and direct hostilities.”19
Given the high level of uncertainty about American intentions, Sawyer’s first
move involved the collection, assessment, and dissemination of intelligence. Less
than a day after the battle-scarred Belvidera made Halifax, Sawyer dispatched
the naval sloop Colibri to New York under a flag of truce to determine whether
a state of war existed. He also sent vessels to London and Jamaica with details of
the attack. Just in case it had not been an accident, he dispatched another warship
to warn the commanding officer at Newfoundland and ask for reinforcements.20
All these reports were incomplete. Sawyer could only speculate about why the
Americans had attacked Belvidera. Doing the best he could, Sawyer pieced together the disparate accounts he could glean from American newspapers and the
dated reports of British diplomats.21 It took over a week after Belvidera reached
Halifax to confirm the declaration of war. When Sawyer did receive indisputable
proof of hostilities on July 5, it cost him another warship to carry this news to
England.22
THE SITUATION IN HALIFAX
Sawyer’s response also had to take into account the means at his disposal. He had
but twenty-three operational warships.23 On paper, this might appear impressive,
but his area of operations required extensive deployments. Moreover, he had to
provide escorts to convoys. Few warships were then at Halifax, or at least nothing
approaching the combat power of the American squadron that nearly had overwhelmed Belvidera. That the Admiralty in London had provided Sawyer with less
than an optimal force might lead to accusations of mismanagement, considering
that Britain was the dominant naval power, possessing approximately half the
world’s warship tonnage.24 However, the navy as a whole was stretched thin, given
global naval commitments and ongoing operations against Napoleonic France.25
On June 30, three days after the battle-damaged Belvidera had anchored at
Halifax, the thirty-eight-gun frigate Shannon and the thirty-two-gun frigate
Aeolus arrived. Captain Broke of Shannon related, “We came in five days from
Bermuda—thinking all tranquil & pacific with America—& counting only on
a dull tiresome refit at this port, before we could resume our cruize, . . . but on
arriving here . . . we met rumours of war” (emphasis original).26 Chance favored
the British. Not only had Belvidera escaped, but a planned refit had brought two
additional frigates to Halifax. Sawyer saw an opportunity. Belvidera completed
hasty repairs and Sawyer’s flagship, the sixty-four-gun Africa, stood ready. With
Shannon and Aeolus, the British had three frigates and a sixty-four-gun ship
concentrated for operations. Sawyer thought this force sufficient to deal with the
American squadron. Shannon, Africa, Belvidera, and Aeolus sailed from Halifax
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
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on July 5 under the overall command of Captain Broke, just hours after receiving
indisputable proof that the United States in fact had declared war.27
Rather than assigning Broke command of his most powerful naval detachment, Sawyer surely wished to raise his flag in Africa and personally proceed
in quest of the American squadron, but he remained at Halifax. The uncertain
political and naval situation meant that Sawyer needed to stay in communication. At Halifax, Sawyer could coordinate better among the various elements of
his command. He had no idea when reinforcements would arrive, he had yet to
receive instructions from London detailing specific objectives or rules of engagement, and he was unclear regarding what kind of war the Americans intended
to wage. In addition, the location of the American squadron that had attacked
Belvidera was unknown. Tracking down leads would require significant adaptation, and this could draw the British squadron far from Halifax.
Moreover, Sawyer expected developments in the Gulf of Maine and its offshoot, the Bay of Fundy. This constricted area of water contained several important British Canadian ports, including Saint John, New Brunswick. To complicate matters, the bordering New England states were the center of American
maritime activity. Sawyer expected cities such as Boston, Salem, Gloucester, and
Marblehead, Massachusetts, to fit out numerous privateers.28 Such commerce
raiders possessed government-issued licenses to prey on British shipping but
were owned, fitted out, and manned by private individuals, resulting in a statesanctioned business venture that sought profit from the capture of commerce
belonging to hostile states.
The threat of American privateers materialized more slowly than expected,
however. It took eight days after the declaration of war for the U.S. government to
legalize their use.29 An additional factor delayed the sailing of privateers: in April
1812, Congress had placed a ninety-day embargo on all American shipping. This
prevented the sailing of American merchant ships, with the object of keeping the
Royal Navy from sweeping them from the seas in the first weeks of a war. The
embargo did not expire until July 4, 1812—and the government made no exception for privateers.30 As one U.S. newspaper aptly printed, “Is it not very odd that
privateers would be prevented from sailing sixteen days after war is declared?”31
A narrow window of opportunity existed during which the Americans might
have benefited from the Royal Navy’s ignorance of hostilities. That window had
closed by the time American privateers entered the fray because HMS Indian,
an eighteen-gun sloop, and Plumper, a ten-gun brig, already had reached the
Bay of Fundy.32 Although this did not prevent American privateers from taking several quick prizes and even blockading the British Canadian port of Saint
Andrews, British actions mitigated the damage. Sawyer assessed the threat as
severe. When Spartan, a thirty-eight-gun frigate, returned to Halifax on July
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/6
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9, Sawyer dispatched it to the Bay of Fundy. The thirty-six-gun Maidstone, the
first wartime reinforcement to reach Sawyer’s command, joined Spartan. British
warships alternated among escorting convoys, including a hastily organized one
of a hundred vessels; patrolling to sweep up privateers; and conducting small
raids up rivers to neutralize privateers in their nests.33 The British had significant
success, taking more than twenty privateers between mid-July and mid-August,
with nearly all the captures occurring in the waters between the Bay of Fundy
and Halifax.34
Sawyer’s decision to remain at Halifax instead of sailing in quest of Rodgers’s
squadron also allowed for the more effective employment of eleven reinforcing warships. Quietly dispatched between mid-May and July, they trickled into
North American waters during the early months of the war. The Admiralty had
intended these warships to take the place of those cycling home with convoys and
to provide limited reinforcements to buttress Sawyer’s command in the midst of
worsening tensions with the United States. But they served a different purpose,
giving Sawyer additional options and helping to soften the initial blows to British
commerce.35
TWO SQUADRONS
With Admiral Sawyer remaining at Halifax to manage naval deployments across
the theater of operations, Captain Broke had a more specific objective: dealing
with Commodore Rodgers and his squadron of American warships. The British
decision to seek out the American squadron rested on the assessment that Rod
gers posed the most dangerous threat to British maritime interests. He had the
strength to eliminate British warships, put SLOCs at risk, and savage a valuable
convoy. Whereas American privateers aimed at inflicting cumulative losses on
British maritime commerce over a protracted period, Rodgers’s squadron in a
single blow could inflict significant damage, not just to commercial shipping, but
even to British warships.
Sawyer had two choices when developing instructions for Broke. He could
provide restrictive orders, in an effort to maintain tighter control, or he could
provide his intent, trusting his subordinate to execute operations effectively.
During the period of uncertainty at the outbreak of the conflict, it was unclear
whether the Americans expected direct aid from France. Sawyer worried that
such aid would manifest as a combined expedition aimed at Halifax. In hindsight, an attack on Halifax was beyond the means of the United States; however,
the possibility caused Sawyer concern during July 1812, and he had no way to
recall Broke in the event such an attack transpired.36 Given this factor alone, there
certainly was much to be said for keeping tight control over Broke’s detachment.
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However, the nature of communications, coupled with the scarcity of warships,
led Sawyer to choose a decentralized command model. The speed of communications limited any attempt at control because it would stifle Broke’s initiative.
This was particularly true given the uncertainty about the Rodgers squadron.
Restrictive orders would make an encounter with the American squadron less
likely. Sawyer explained to Broke that his actions “must depend on information
you may from time to time obtain either of the situation or movements of the
American Squadron or other circumstances, and it is left to your judgement and
discretion to act as shall appear to you best for His Majesty’s Service.” Sawyer
prioritized forward deployments, but this caused Sawyer to explain to Broke, “I
have no means of keeping up a communication with you, till the arrival of reinforcements from England.”37 Without reserves, Sawyer became isolated from the
operational elements of his command. Sawyer decided to trust Broke to make
informed decisions.
Four days out, Broke’s squadron linked up with the thirty-eight-gun British
frigate Guerriere.38 Broke now controlled four frigates and a ship of the line. This
was a powerful squadron, especially when viewed as a percentage of Sawyer’s
overall command. At the outbreak of hostilities, Sawyer controlled five true frigates; Broke now had four of them in his squadron, leaving only Spartan for other
assignments. Also attached to Broke’s squadron was the sixty-four-gun Africa.
Launched in 1781 and hardly considered a frontline warship by 1812, Admiralty
documents still described Africa as a third-rate ship of the line—the sole warship
larger than a frigate in Sawyer’s entire command.39
Thus, Sawyer had depleted the combat power of his entire command to provide Broke with an effective force. It now fell on Broke to determine the location
of Rodgers’s squadron. The last positive intelligence was over two weeks old, dating from Belvidera’s running fight. Broke had to make an educated guess regarding what Rodgers had done in the meantime. He concluded that the Americans
most likely had returned to either Boston or New York, the principal ports with
the maritime infrastructure to sustain a powerful American naval squadron.
Therefore Broke took his squadron toward Nantucket, to place his ships between
those two cities. He hoped to lure Rodgers out for a fight by attacking trade in the
area.40 Broke maintained that he would “continue to destroy all such as are not
worth our sending in . . . and hope thus to make the Enemy feel the Evils of the
War they have so wantonly began.”41
Then, on July 12, Broke fell in with Colibri, the flag-of-truce vessel Sawyer had
sent to New York. Several British diplomats had taken passage aboard Colibri there,
and they provided Broke with intelligence on the strength of Rodgers’s squadron. It
contained the forty-four-gun President, the forty-four-gun United States, the thirtysix-gun Congress, the eighteen-gun Hornet, and the sixteen-gun Argus.42
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/6

NWC_Autumn2017Review.indb 8

8

8/7/17 11:58 AM

86

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

McCranie: Confronting Uncertainty with Decentralized Command, British Naval

Sawyer had dispatched Broke’s command with an object of defeating the
American squadron. How well would the sixty-four-gun Africa, the thirty-eightgun Shannon, the thirty-eight-gun Guerriere, the thirty-six-gun Belvidera, and
the thirty-two-gun Aeolus have done in an engagement with Rodgers’s command? First, it should be noted that the rated number of guns provides only an
approximation of combat power; most of the warships mentioned above mounted more than their rated number of guns. The rating system itself was a legacy
system that did not take into account developments such as the introduction
of the short-range carronade. Moreover, the Americans had a tendency to rate
warships smaller than they actually were—this served a propaganda purpose.43
In this case, it meant that the thirty-six-gun Congress displaced roughly two
hundred tons more, and had a slightly heavier broadside, than either the thirtyeight-gun Shannon or the thirty-eight-gun Guerriere.44
How the British warships compared with forty-four-gun American warships
such as President and United States is a particularly thorny question. William
James, a contemporary observer and the first British historian of the war, argued
that warships such as President were built of heavier timbers than seventy-fourgun British ships of the line.45 In a later study, Theodore Roosevelt countered,
“The American 44-gun frigate was a true frigate.”46 In reality, President and
United States displaced about 40 percent more than thirty-eight-gun frigates such
as Shannon and Guerriere and 50 percent more than thirty-six-gun frigates such
as Belvidera. In terms of armament, the principal battery of the American warships consisted of twenty-four-pound guns, while British frigates such as Shannon, Guerriere, and Belvidera mounted eighteen-pound guns. In comparison
with a sixty-four-gun ship such as Africa, President and United States displaced
approximately 150 tons more, had a similar complement, and threw a broadside
that was one hundred pounds heavier, albeit with a larger percentage of shortrange carronades.47
Considering the above information, the two squadrons were fairly equal in
aggregate combat power, but several factors gave the British a slight advantage.
Although each squadron contained five warships, the small sizes of the Americans’ Hornet and Argus would make them very fragile instruments of war in any
engagement. Moreover, two-thirds of Rodgers’s total broadside weight consisted
of carronades, including almost the entire armament of Hornet and Argus; carronades comprised only 40 percent of the British broadside weight.48 In a longrange engagement, the Americans would have to rely on two oversized frigates
and one just a bit more powerful than Shannon to fight a sixty-four-gun ship and
four smaller frigates.
Although the odds were in Broke’s favor, he worried that Rodgers had linked
up with other U.S. frigates. Information gleaned from American newspapers
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
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indicated that the thirty-two-gun Essex likely had joined the American squadron.
And Broke believed that Constitution, the third forty-four-gun American frigate,
also might have joined Rodgers.49 The addition of either of these warships would
tilt the odds in Rodgers’s favor.
In the worst case, Broke’s command had the combat power to inflict enough
damage to make the American squadron a nonfactor in the coming months. By
the time the Americans had repaired any battle damage, British naval reinforcements would have shifted the naval balance in American waters permanently.
OFF NEW YORK
The diplomats aboard Colibri also informed Broke that Rodgers had not returned
to port after his action with Belvidera. “It was generally believed they were
gone in search of the homeward bound West Indies Fleet under convoy of the
Thalia.”50 Although this was accurate information, Broke needed confirmation,
so he proceeded toward the entrance to Long Island Sound.51 On July 14, he left
his squadron over the horizon and brought Shannon inshore to gather intelligence about the American squadron. Specifically, Broke sought local fishermen
or those involved in the coasting trade; such individuals stayed connected with
events ashore and had access to local newspapers.52
Since it was unlikely that an American would speak with a British naval
captain knowingly, Broke perpetrated a ruse. He hoisted American colors over
Shannon and pretended to be the U.S. frigate Congress. It would take an extremely
educated eye to tell Congress and Shannon apart: their dimensions were nearly
identical and each mounted eighteen-pounders on its main gun deck.53 (Flying
false colors was a perfectly legitimate deception that all navies of this period used;
the deception became dishonorable only if one fired on an opponent while still
under a false flag.)54
In two separate incidents, Broke lured fishermen aboard Shannon. He even
told them that he had parted company with Commodore Rodgers after running
low on water. Broke described the fishermen as “thoroughly deceived,” for they
provided him with significant information, including accurate details about the
engagement with Belvidera.55 Since Broke knew the correctness of this news, he
viewed the remaining information as more reliable, including reports that Rod
gers had pursued a homeward-bound British West India convoy.56 The information gleaned from the fishermen, in combination with the reports received from
the diplomats aboard Colibri, indicated that Rodgers had pursued a West India
convoy. But Broke remained skeptical; although the diplomats and fishermen had
provided similar information, Broke worried that the newspapers on which the
intelligence was based were inaccurate. Broke announced, “I shall anxiously seek
for some further accounts of the American Squadron.”57
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Broke was not the only one attempting to locate Rodgers; U.S. Secretary of
the Navy Paul Hamilton also wanted to find him. At the outbreak of hostilities,
Hamilton had given Rodgers permission to surprise British warships in the offing before “returning immediately after into port.”58 However, after attacking
Belvidera Rodgers did not follow Hamilton’s instructions. It took several weeks
for Hamilton to realize that Rodgers was seeking bigger objectives than isolated
British warships. The arrival of British warships on the U.S. coast caused Hamilton’s apprehension to grow, so he dispatched the fourteen-gun Nautilus to locate
Rodgers’s squadron. Nautilus proceeded to sea on July 15 with a difficult task.
There were two squadrons at sea—one under Rodgers, the other under Broke.
They were similar in size, and from a distance would look very much alike. Nautilus’s challenge was to find the right squadron; at this it failed. Nautilus fell in
with Broke’s command on July 16, and after a short chase became Broke’s prize.59
No sooner had Broke gobbled up Nautilus than his frigates chanced on Constitution. The outbreak of hostilities had found the latter in Annapolis, Maryland,
and in need of additional men. Hamilton ordered Constitution to join Rodgers
at New York. The ship was off New Jersey when Broke’s squadron found it. After
an epic chase, Constitution finally outran the British squadron on the morning
of July 19.60
During the pursuit of Constitution, Broke’s squadron became badly strung out,
with the frigates drawing well ahead of Africa and Nautilus; Africa, an old sixtyfour-gun ship, could hardly keep up with the more nimble frigates, and Nautilus
was manned with only a prize crew. Africa’s captain, not waiting for instructions,
sent Nautilus to Halifax with the information that Broke had obtained. Sawyer
had not provided Broke the means to stay in contact, but the fortuitous capture
of Nautilus alleviated this issue. Later, Broke described the captain of Africa as
acting with “great judgement”: with only a prize crew, Nautilus added little to
the British squadron but could provide Sawyer with valuable intelligence, and
Africa’s captain seized the opportunity.61
The news Nautilus carried informed Sawyer of Broke’s movements over the
previous two weeks. Broke consistently had positioned his squadron where
Rodgers was most likely to come to him. Initially, Broke had expected Rodgers’s
squadron to be anchored at either Boston or New York. He tried to draw Rodgers
out for a fight by putting American commerce at risk. Simultaneously, he sought
intelligence. What he obtained indicated that Rodgers was still at sea, likely in
search of a convoy. If true, such intelligence changed Broke’s mission. While
continuing to seek confirmation, Broke placed his command between Rodgers’s
squadron at sea and his most likely base of operations at New York. In this location, Broke’s squadron was positioned to snap up Nautilus and Constitution. The
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latter escaped only by superior sailing. Broke accurately concluded that both
Nautilus and Constitution also were on the lookout for Rodgers’s squadron.62
OF CONVOYS
After chasing Constitution, Broke pondered his next move. He needed to shift his
squadron from its position off New York. The longer it remained, the more likely
it became that Rodgers would divine Broke’s position and avoid him by seeking
another port. Rather than gamble on the port to which Rodgers would return or
search for the American squadron directly, and “[h]aving received undoubted
information [that] Commodore Rogers [sic] was gone upon the Grand Bank of
Newfoundland to lie [in] wait for our West India Convoys and considering the
vast injury his squadron might do in that point,” Broke later would explain that
“it appeared to me the more important duty to abandon the plan we had entered
upon for distressing the Enemy trade, for the protection of our own.”63
Broke understood the centrality of Britain’s maritime trade. No matter how
much he wanted to engage the American squadron or gain prize money by capturing American merchant commerce, the ulterior objective of protecting British
commerce remained paramount. So Broke sailed eastward across the Atlantic
in quest of the West India convoy. Oddly enough, finding the convoy increased
the likelihood of encountering Rodgers: since convoys sailed along predictable
routes, this one would act as a magnet for the American commodore. By seeking
out the convoy, Broke again was attempting to force Rodgers to come to him.
On the morning of July 29, the squadron exchanged signals with the convoy’s
sole escort, the thirty-eight-gun frigate Thetis, about six hundred miles east of
New York City.64 Broke explained, “This fleet was talked of confidentially in
America as the chief object of Commodore Rogers’ [sic] hazardous enterprise;—
we shall at least ensure their safety, and I hope our escorting them may lead to a
meeting of the Squadron.”65
But Broke’s assessment was flawed: although he had found a West India convoy, he had not found the one Rodgers had pursued. The convoy Broke located
comprised approximately seventy ships and had sailed in early July; Rodgers
instead had pursued the May convoy, comprising 120 merchant vessels escorted
by the thirty-six-gun frigate Thalia and the eighteen-gun sloop Reindeer.66 After
the running fight with Belvidera, Rodgers had approached the May convoy. Rodgers nipped at its heels between June 29 and mid-July; he received reports from
several merchant vessels that the convoy was nearby; his squadron even sailed
through garbage the convoy had left floating in its wake. But the pursuit was to
no avail, and on July 13, when Rodgers was nearly into the approaches to the English Channel, he called it off. All this occurred before Broke even had captured
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Nautilus. After Rodgers gave up his quest for the convoy, he made a large circuit
of the Atlantic before heading home.67
The convoy Broke found was never in danger—but this assessment is available
only from the perspective of hindsight. Both the Admiralty in London and Sawyer at Halifax approved of Broke’s actions.68 Given the convoy’s value, the weakness of its escort, and the uncertainty of the American threat, the risk had been
too high to act otherwise. The convoyed merchant vessels had arrived safely; the
prime difficulty in assessing successful commerce defense involves understanding why it worked. Rather than seeking the enemy and defeating it through a
sequential series of actions, commerce protection involved the complex interplay
of convoys, escorts, and patrols—and a high degree of chance. Only by knowing
Rodgers’s position in relation to that of the convoy can one conclude that Broke
did nothing either to deter the American squadron or to protect the convoy most
at risk. Although Broke failed to bring Rodgers to battle, he had assessed the
available intelligence, understood the centrality of commerce in Britain’s grand
strategy, and concentrated his squadron at a decisive point—in this case, in relation to a convoy. Instead of directly seeking battle with Rodgers, Broke prioritized
Britain’s trading empire, understanding that this course of action was the most
likely way to bring Rodgers to him.
So Broke’s squadron stayed with the convoy as it lumbered toward England.
Africa and Thetis provided direct protection, while the frigates chased down
sightings. One of these turned out to be an American merchant vessel that had
encountered Rodgers’s squadron on July 10. Broke learned that Rodgers had
not pursued Thetis’s convoy but instead was ahead of it. Prevailing currents and
winds would make it difficult for Rodgers to double back and attack the convoy
that Broke now protected. Thus, it was reasonably safe. Even so, Broke split his
squadron, leaving Africa and Guerriere to assist Thetis in shepherding the flock
of merchantmen.69
At longitude 45 degrees W, these two warships followed Broke’s orders and
parted with the convoy. Over the next week, they slowly clawed their way back toward Halifax. On the afternoon of August 14, Guerriere and Africa intentionally
went separate ways: Africa steered for Halifax, carrying Broke’s official reports,
while Guerriere continued on patrol. Only five days after parting with Africa,
Guerriere encountered Constitution. The ensuing battle resulted in the first significant British naval loss of the war.70
GROPING IN THE DARK—TO LITTLE EFFECT
Meanwhile, Broke took Shannon, Belvidera, and Aeolus toward the American
coast, where he hoped to intercept Rodgers. Broke was now attempting to confront the American squadron with only three frigates, since he had gleaned from
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various sources of intelligence that Rodgers also had three frigates, not four or
even five as Broke once had believed.71 Another factor in Broke’s decision to confront Rodgers with a reduced force stemmed from his assessment of the U.S. Navy.
When Broke learned of Constitution’s victory over Guerriere, he concluded, “We
are all eager for an opportunity of convincing the Yankees how much they are indebted to chance for their success in this contest. Their force is superior in ship &
metal & number of men—but not in skill or courage equal” (emphasis original).72
Broke did not respect his opponent, and it can be assumed that he thought the
crews of his three smaller frigates equal to the task of defeating Rodgers’s more
powerful frigates.
However, by reducing his squadron to three frigates Broke had accepted additional risk; there was no margin for any circumstance that would further reduce
his command. This is exactly what occurred on the night of August 10, when
Belvidera became separated from Shannon and Aeolus during a chase. Belvidera’s
Captain Byron then captured Hare, an American merchant brig with a treasure
trove of intelligence. Some weeks earlier, Hare had encountered Rodgers’s squadron. Thinking the merchantman would beat the American squadron home, a
number of letters were sent across. These now fell into British hands. Understanding their significance, Byron immediately pressed for Halifax.73
When Belvidera arrived on August 24, Byron not only brought Sawyer the captured letters; he provided the first reports of Broke’s movements over the previous
month. Problematically, Byron did not have Broke’s actual reports—these were
aboard Africa, which still was making its way slowly toward Halifax. Without a
clear description of Broke’s intentions, Sawyer faced considerable uncertainty, but
he needed to act quickly. The captured letters indicated that the Americans would
return to the United States at the end of August. Sawyer directed the thirty-eightgun Spartan and thirty-six-gun Maidstone to reinforce Broke.74 These reinforcements became even more important when Aeolus had to go in for water—Broke
was now alone as Rodgers approached.75
At Halifax, Sawyer obtained additional intelligence about Rodgers from
Statira, a thirty-eight-gun frigate that Sawyer had taken under his command after
the start of hostilities. The ship encountered Rodgers’s squadron on August 26
while patrolling along Saint Georges Bank. The distance between the American
warships and Statira was enough to leave both sides in doubt about the exact
nature of the encounter, but two days later Statira again fell in with the squadron,
and this time the Americans spied the British frigate and gave chase. The pursuit
lasted sixteen grueling hours before the weather came on thick, swallowing up
the British ship.76 Rodgers again had failed to capture an isolated British warship;
and, just as Belvidera had done two months earlier, Statira carried news of the
encounter to Halifax. Sawyer quickly assembled another squadron comprising
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Statira; the forty-gun Acasta and the thirty-eight-gun Nymphe, two other wartime frigate reinforcements; and the former U.S. sloop Nautilus, now recommissioned as Emulous. This squadron sailed on September 2 with orders to find
Broke and defeat the American squadron.77
This was all for naught, however. The same day that Statira made Halifax, the
American squadron anchored at Boston. Sawyer characterized the American
venture as “a very unsuccessful cruize—having taken and destroyed seven vessels
of little value.”78 Rodgers certainly achieved less than he had desired. He failed
to capture a single British warship or locate even a small British convoy. Yet the
British could consider themselves extremely fortunate. The American squadron
had chased Statira and had come within the narrowest margin of capturing Belvidera. And only a few miles had separated Rodgers from an extremely valuable
but weakly escorted West India convoy of approximately 120 merchant vessels.
A RETURN TO THE LARGER PICTURE
Sawyer had devoted the best of his command to seeking out Rodgers’s squadron,
at the expense of other responsibilities. Even as late as September 9, Sawyer wrote
of “the inferior force I had to meet the various exigencies” on the station.79 Broke
added, “I am bitterly disappointed at not meeting the squadron we are looking
for—& who have diverted our attention from every other pursuit.”80 Privateers
had damaged British commerce, and many American merchant vessels had escaped the tentacles of the Royal Navy while Broke sought Rodgers.
Worse still, British deployments had broken down. British actions hinged on
Broke maintaining concentration at the critical point, but the nature of period
communications and the lack of smaller vessels to carry reports between Broke
and Sawyer curtailed effective interaction. Without efficient communications,
the instructions Sawyer provided Broke in early July became critical. High levels
of uncertainty caused Sawyer to allow Broke significant discretion in developing
a course of action. By all evidence, Broke ably assessed available information
and acted in accordance with the intent of his instructions and Britain’s strategic
priorities. The result, however, drew Broke deep into the Atlantic to protect a
vulnerable convoy. There was no way to keep Sawyer informed. After seeing the
convoy to safety, Broke allowed his command to fragment. This was in part a response to intelligence about the strength of Rodgers’s squadron, but other factors
contributed to the five-ship squadron becoming five widely separated individual
warships.
In the aftermath, Guerriere was lost in combat. Africa slowly lumbered back
to Halifax with Broke’s reports. The delay in getting these to Sawyer further
contributed to the uncertainty gripping British operations in late August and
early September. Belvidera separated from Broke in a chase, then captured vital
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intelligence about Rodgers’s movements. Captain Byron took the information to
Halifax, since this was a fixed point, whereas seeking Broke was akin to finding a
needle in a haystack. After apprising Sawyer at Halifax, Belvidera failed to rejoin
Broke before Rodgers reached Boston.81 Aeolus parted with Shannon on August
28 because of a lack of water. As luck would have it, Aeolus encountered Spartan
and Maidstone the next day. They provided Aeolus with enough water to remain
on station, but they failed to locate Shannon.82 Broke found himself alone on the
American coast—and Rodgers slipped by everyone.
Then, adding insult to injury, Broke encountered the U.S. frigate Essex late
in the afternoon of September 4. Although Shannon overhauled the American
frigate, darkness fell before Broke could bring the American to action. It was a
close-run affair, with the captain of Essex describing his escape as “extraordinary.”
The result likely would have been quite different if Broke had had another frigate
or two in company, allowing him to use multiple warships to cut off Essex.83 The
lack of water, chance, and other priorities had left Broke alone, however.
BRITISH NAVAL LEADERSHIP
Captain Broke’s performance exemplifies naval leadership at the operational level
of war. His assessment of intelligence, acceptance of risk, and decision making
despite limited information provide instructive examples. Six weeks into the operation, Broke’s squadron fragmented. This was, at least in part, the result of the
choices he made; but how long can an isolated squadron commander maintain
the mental acuity to make the best choices before uncertainty leads to negative
results?
While Broke dealt with the single problem of Rodgers’s squadron, Sawyer had
to master theater command. He had twenty-three warships at the outbreak of
hostilities, and this number grew with the arrival of the thirty-six-gun Maidstone,
thirty-eight-gun Nymphe, forty-gun Acasta, and thirty-eight-gun Statira. In addition, seven smaller warships arrived with convoys.84 These reinforcements were
offset during the first three months of the war by the combat losses of the thirtyeight-gun Guerriere and the schooner Laura, while the British lost the eighteengun Emulous to the wiles of the ocean.85 Normal operations also diminished
the command. Sawyer dispatched several warships with convoys, while others
carried news of hostilities to distant locations. By September, Sawyer’s command
was only slightly larger than it had been at the outbreak of hostilities; however, it
did contain a larger percentage of frigates.
Sawyer juggled forces and prioritized commitments, acting most decisively
when he received news of Rodgers’s squadron, first by dispatching Broke, then
by sending Spartan and Maidstone, and finally by dispatching Statira, Nymphe,
and Acasta. Convoys sailed at regular intervals—Sawyer did not interrupt their
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sailings because of the war; in fact, he provided escorts for the unexpected convoy that departed British Canadian ports in the Bay of Fundy in July. Sawyer also
provided warships to maintain a presence around Halifax and Bermuda, the two
bases that were essential to sustaining his command.
Finally, Sawyer sought out American privateers. This proved easier than it
should have been, owing to U.S. government delay in passing enabling legislation
for commissioning private armed vessels, as well as the decision not to amend
the 1812 Embargo Act to allow privateers to sail before it expired. For privateers,
surprise came not from where but when they would strike. Commerce warfare
could inflict more significant damage if conducted before widespread knowledge
of the commencement of hostilities. Once Sawyer had learned of the declaration
of war, he understood that the Gulf of Maine and the Bay of Fundy would be
prime operating grounds. It would take longer for the Americans to commission
a meaningful number of large, oceangoing privateers; until then, hastily commissioned, smaller private armed vessels could seek easy prizes in nearby waters.
Overall, however, the British were less vulnerable than they should have been,
owing to American delays and Sawyer’s foresight.
Sawyer managed naval deployments during the opening months of the war effectively, but the Admiralty decided he was unfit for independent command. He
had been appointed to his position in October 1810, when North America was a
backwater: tensions had calmed after the Leopard-Chesapeake incident, and the
shooting incident between President and Little Belt was months in the future. But
once the Admiralty became aware of hostilities in late July 1812, it sought a more
experienced commander.
Although Sawyer managed naval operations effectively, he lacked an appreciation of broader political considerations. In early July, Sawyer had dispatched
Julia to England with “certain intelligence of the act of the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States Declaring War against Great Britain having
been approved by the President.” When Julia’s commander, Valentine Gardner,
brought Sawyer’s dispatches to the lords commissioners of the Admiralty, they
censored Sawyer, noting “their regret that on a subject of such extreme importance as that of a declaration of war by America you should not have given their
Lordships the particulars of the information which you state yourself to have
received, and that you did not send the American official documents upon this
subject which Captain Gardner of the Julia reports to have seen at Halifax.”86
Sawyer’s haste in dispatching this information to London likely led to the
omissions. Certainly, he had operated in a vague sense of suspended animation for the week between Belvidera’s arrival at Halifax following the ship’s escape from Rodgers’s squadron and the official confirmation of the war. These
were tense and uncertain days, and it is understandable that Sawyer failed to
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provide the Admiralty all the details. Although the omission might have been
understandable, the Admiralty did not view it as excusable. For one thing, the
First Lord of the Admiralty had to address other government leaders about the
declaration of war without critical documentation, which was embarrassing.
Moreover, Sawyer did not direct Captain Gardner to detain the mail and passengers aboard Julia until the Admiralty had been informed about the declaration
of war. This failure led the Admiralty to complain that the resultant “spillage” (to
use a modern term) provided that “the Public was in possession of as early and
more ample information than His Majesty’s Government” (emphasis original).87
This was not just embarrassing; it caused Britain’s political leaders to work at a
disadvantage as they tried to address the outbreak of hostilities. So, while Sawyer
may have managed naval operations on a distant station adequately, he lacked
the political acumen to interface with the British government. There was more
to command on a distant station than merely being proficient at the operational
level of war. The Admiralty understood that Sawyer was operationally competent,
but not politically savvy.
Rather than remove Sawyer, the Admiralty decided to amalgamate the North
America, Leeward Islands, and Jamaica stations under a senior admiral who
could provide the oversight necessary to link the political, strategic, and operational aspects of Britain’s naval response to the War of 1812. Sawyer would
remain the senior officer at Halifax, where he could focus on operational issues,
while the new commander would manage operations from Halifax to Barbados.88
The presumed ability of one officer to command such an extensive area of operations led to the following quip: “Why they have excluded the East Indies and the
Mediterranean, I know not, for surely they might as rationally have been included
in this most unprecedented command.”89 Certainly, it was unparalleled—and in
fact proved unwieldy.
The Admiralty’s choice to fill the new positon was Admiral Sir John Borlase
Warren. He had commanded in North America in the aftermath of the LeopardChesapeake affair and had extensive experience both operationally and as a
diplomat.90 Although Warren’s command included the North America, Leeward
Islands, and Jamaica stations, it is telling that he sailed directly for Halifax. This
was the decisive point for controlling British naval operations in its war against
America, and Warren needed to establish communications with Sawyer to obtain
firsthand information about the progress of the naval war.
When Captain Broke learned of the change, he wrote, “Sir John Warren’s arrival makes a grand revolution in our government, poor Adml Sawyer is much
hurt at the rude manner in which the Admty have deprived him of his chief
command.—perhaps he will go home.”91 This was prophetic. Warren reached
Halifax on September 26, and just days later Warren wrote privately to a member
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of the Admiralty that Sawyer was “unwell & I believe it is so & he is very Grumpy
also at what he calls being superseded in his command.” Rather than having a
disgruntled subordinate, Warren gave Sawyer permission to return to England.92
With Warren’s arrival, the first chapter of Britain’s naval War of 1812 came to a
close. Operationally, British naval leaders had demonstrated considerable skill at
managing fog and friction while accounting for uncertainty. The British lacked
a complete picture of American political intentions and an exact understanding
of how the Americans planned to wage war at sea. This required leaders such as
Admiral Sawyer and Captain Broke to work with available information and make
assumptions about the rest.
At the same time, they had to prioritize. Prioritization does not come easily to
a dominant naval power; after all, its navy should be able to master all threats. But
in this case the available warships were insufficient, and it took time for reinforcements to arrive. Sawyer and Broke sacrificed everything else to protect British
commercial shipping. Warships protected convoys and the SLOCs rather than
directly engaging American warships and privateers or sweeping up American
commerce. Sawyer and Broke understood the difference between seeking battle
and ensuring maritime security. In uncertain conditions and with a less-thanadequate force, security took priority. British naval officers in North American
waters showed a keen regard for Britain’s commercial position and understood
the role of warships in supporting Britain’s global maritime trading empire.
Yet Sawyer’s reward was to be superseded as theater commander. The Admiralty did not plan to remove Sawyer—he was an effective operator. Instead, Sawyer asked to be removed, since he felt aggrieved when the Admiralty placed Warren in a position to be his immediate superior. To demonstrate that the Admiralty
held little ill will, the same First Lord of the Admiralty by 1814 had appointed
Sawyer to command the Irish station. This was a command in close communication with London that oversaw convoys and patrols on the approaches to the
English Channel—a command that demanded Sawyer’s expertise.93
However, the outbreak of war with the United States required a different
type of know-how; it demanded an admiral who simultaneously could manage
deployments and communicate broader strategic and even policy-level considerations. Sawyer did not communicate well enough with his political superiors.
Distance and the speed of communications certainly made exchanges with
London more difficult, but these factors were known, and Sawyer could have
accounted for them by lavishing more care on his reports, to include all available
documentation. That he did not do so proved embarrassing, which led to friction
between the civilian leaders and their senior officer at Halifax.
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Understanding intent, identifying objects, and managing risk are not the only
hallmarks of success in decentralized command; clarity and precision in communications prove just as important, for without these attributes, the tenuous
links among decentralized nodes of authority become strained. The Americans
contributed enough to the uncertain environment; ambiguity need not have been
exacerbated by the failure of naval leaders to provide adequate communications
with their civilian masters.
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